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Abstract 
___________________________________________________________________ 
This study compared how the centralization of Egyptian Islamic Higher Education 
historically affected educational quality, probity of school management and general 
levels of and appreciation for Islamic knowledge. This research compared 
characteristics of Egyptian Islamic Higher Education during four pivotal historical 
periods: the early medieval period (623-1300s C.E.); the 15th century; the 16th and 
17th centuries; and the period of British and French colonization (the 19th and 20th 
centuries). The logic behind choosing these time periods for comparison was that 
they represented times of significant centralization/decentralization. Upon analysis 
of the effects of centralization and de-centralization, it has been found that the 
centralization of Islamic Higher Education in Egypt has had negative effects. It was 
identified that the centralization of Islamic Higher Education played a central role in 
decreasing educational quality, increasing corruption, decreasing general levels of 
and appreciation for Islamic knowledge, and even supporting Imperial initiatives. 
Such findings are important given the current geopolitical situation of increasing 
centralization of Egyptian Islamic higher education.   
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Resumen 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Este estudio compara cómo la centralización de la educación superior islámica 
egipcia ha afectado históricamente la calidad educativa, la probidad de la gestión 
escolar y los niveles generales de apreciación del conocimiento islámico. La 
investigación ha comparado las características de la educación superior islámica 
egipcia durante cuatro períodos históricos fundamentales: el período medieval 
temprano (623-1300s C.E.); el siglo XV; los siglos XVI y XVII; y el período de 
colonización británica y francesa (siglos XIX y XX). La lógica para la selección de 
estos períodos se debe a que representan épocas de significativa 
centralización/descentralización. Tras el análisis de los efectos de la centralización y 
la descentralización, se ha identificado que la centralización de la educación 
superior islámica en Egipto ha generado efectos negativos. Esta jugó un papel 
central en la disminución de la calidad educativa, el aumento de la corrupción, la 
reducción de los niveles generales y la apreciación del conocimiento islámico, e 
incluso del apoyo a las iniciativas imperiales. Tales hallazgos son importantes dada 
la situación geopolítica actual, con una creciente centralización de la educación 
superior islámica en Egipto.  
 
Palabras Clave: centralización, islámico, educación superior, Egipto, análisis 
histórico 
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rom the Medieval to the present, Islamic Higher Education in Egypt 
has witnessed an intense process of centralization. This study 
compares how, over time, the centralization of Islamic Higher 
Education affected educational quality, probity of school 
management and general levels of and appreciation for knowledge. This 
research involves comparing characteristics of Egyptian Islamic Higher 
Education at four pivotal points in time: the early medieval period (623-
1300s C.E.); the 15th century; the 16th and 17th centuries; and the period of 
British and French colonization (the 19th and 20th centuries). The logic 
behind choosing these particular time periods for comparison is that they 
represent times of significant centralization/ decentralization of Egyptian 
Islamic Higher Education; upon analysis of the effects of (de) centralization, 
many useful lessons can be derived for suggestions on improving modern 
day Egyptian Islamic Higher Education.  
 
Background of Islamic Education in Muslim-majority
1
 countries 
 
Seeking knowledge has been of particular interest in Muslim-majority 
countries for a long time, especially since what is academically2 considered 
the advent of Islam, beginning with the first Qur’anic revelation—
“Read/Recite! In the name of your Lord, who has created all that exists…” 
(Qur’an 96, v1) in the seventh century C.E. In Islam, acquisition of 
knowledge —the two types being that gained through revelation and that 
gained through the senses—is justified and directed by the provision that all 
knowledge gained be used in worship of the creator (defined broadly as any 
belief, speech, or action that pleases God as outlined in the Qur’an and 
Sunnah) (Halstead, 2004). Accordingly, the most important type of 
knowledge in Islam is theological, meaning understanding the will and 
nature of Allah (Arabic for ‘God’) through the Qur’an (the literal word of 
God) and Sunnah (way of prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, on how 
to apply the former) (Uthaymeen, 2004).  
Throughout Islamic history, once ulamaa (sg: Alim, ‘scholars of the 
theological sciences’) mastered foundational texts in theology, they would 
utilize this knowledge as lenses to support and guide the development of 
entire sciences (thereby fulfilling a communal obligation in knowledge 
production). There was never an artificial barrier constructed between 
F 
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empirical sciences and revelation because Islam legislates that two Truths 
cannot contradict each other—and that Tawheed (the oneness of God and 
that none has the right to be worshipped except Him) implies a certain unity 
and intrinsic harmony in the universe due to the oneness of the creator. 
Seeking knowledge was for the purpose of increasing 'God consciousness' 
among people (Iqbal, 2007; Progler, 2001).   
Unfortunately, much of modern (19th century onward) research done in 
the West on the Middle Eastern educational systems of the Middle Ages has 
glossed over most non-theological education that occurred in fields ranging 
from Medicine to Architecture; the result has been the confection of a 
revisionist history where the religious sphere of society was somehow 
divorced from the rest (Iqbal, 2007; Kincheloe & Steinberg, 2004, p.130), a 
political initiative probably highly motivated by modern debates on the role 
of ‘religion’ 3  (‘deen’) in Muslim-majority societies (Turner, 2007). Such 
selective memory leads to an easily consumed myth for a progressive-
minded audience: that such people, who supposedly have nothing but 
theological knowledge, would either be particularly unsuitable for the 
modern world, or—an even more extreme presumption—that maybe 
Medieval Muslim-majority countries were even secular all along. This 
imagined history came into play later when colonialists needed to create a 
perceived inferiority in the ‘native’ cultures of those they conquered to 
justify their promotion of the Secular Humanist ideal, secularism (Kincheloe 
& Steinberg, 2004, p. 128)—not without parallels in our own age of neo-
colonialistic endeavors.  
 
De-centralized Islamic Education In The Early Middle Ages 
 
During the early Middle Ages, roughly the first 400 years of Islam (7th 
century-11th century), education in Muslim-majority societies revolved 
around the mosque, which is actually the center of most social activity in 
Islam. By the 14th century, Alexandria alone would have approximately 
14,000 mosques (Szyliowicz, 1973, p. 53). Not only a place for ritual 
worship, the mosque was where Muslims irrespective of ethnicity, origin, 
age, or gender gathered to learn Islamic knowledge of various types—proper 
recitation of Qur’an, Tafseer (exegesis of the Qur’an), Hadeeth (the 
narrations of the Sunnah and their sub sciences), Fiqh (jurisprudence, 
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meaning the various rulings derived from the Qur’an and Sunnah), Arabic 
language and poetry, History, Medicine, and many others (theological and 
empirical). It would not be uncommon to find a 'student' population of a very 
sundry composition, from students who were ulamaa themselves to laymen, 
in the hundreds in one gathering called a halaqa (a circle of people around a 
alim giving a lecture). Islamic education in a mosque was very informal with 
most decision-making regarding everything from curriculum to schedules 
carried out by the individual ulamaa offering the lectures. Understandably, 
such an egalitarian method of education forged a strong Islamic identity and 
reinforced social cohesion (Berkey, 1992, pp. 7, 20; Gunther, 2006). 
Specifically for children, a system of elementary education schools also 
existed, which were fairly indistinguishable from the Kuttabs (elementary 
schools with a little more focus on memorization of Qur’an). Both socialized 
students into a Muslim identity by memorizing the Qur’an by the time they 
were 8-9 years old, and taught them general skills like learning how to read 
and write, basic Geography, and Math. Teachers at these schools were 
expected to maintain high moral character as role models, have memorized 
the Qur’an, and know the basics of non-theological subjects (Szyliowicz, 
1973, pp. 54, 57). Quality of education seems to have been praiseworthy at 
these schools given the high appreciation for Islamic knowledge that the 
above-mentioned principles promoted (Gunther, 2006). Upon finishing 
elementary schools/kuttabs, students could either enter directly into various 
trades and professions or continue onto madaaris for higher education which 
consisted of a base of one or more Sharia based—theological—sciences. 
Thereafter, students could choose to either specialize within this general 
theological base or build upon it and delve into other forms of positivistic 
natural or social sciences (Gesink, 2006, p. 327). 
The Madrasa (pl.madaaris, lit: 'a place of study') was the central formal 
educational institution throughout roughly the second half of Medieval 
Egypt (11th century to 16th century). Madaaris were places of higher 
education usually attached to a mosque, and were funded by awqaaf (sg. 
Waqf)—theological endowments from charity contributions, usually in the 
form of a building or piece of land preserved to be used for theological 
purposes.  Awqaaf were protected from taxes and state seizure (Gesink, 
2006, p. 326). The term 'madrasa' was used interchangeably with 'mosque' 
since in reality a formal location was irrelevant to the learning process; 
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hence, madaaris still provided the same de-centralized structure as mosques. 
Decision-making regarding the structure and components of Islamic Higher 
Education was still made locally by the (usually unpaid) ulamaa who taught 
in the Madaaris. Accordingly, madaaris were only as good as their teachers, 
the ulamaa; ergo, after students had memorized the Qur’an and a certain 
amount of hadeeth they would start studying various treatises/books with 
their Shaykh (more or less a synonym for Alim). Ideally, texts were 
memorized as they were learned in depth—for example a hadeeth might be 
explained in regard to its place in seerah (the prophet’s history), 
jurisprudence rulings, grammar, points of benefit, etc. Also, given that most 
ulamaa were not paid for their services, usually performing other forms of 
manual labor to fund themselves, ulamaa were more likely to be learning 
and teaching Islamic knowledge for metaphysical rewards as opposed to 
material ones (Gunther, 2006; Hefner & Zaman, 2007, pp. 45-47). 
As it has probably been noticed, there was no 'high school' stage of 
education between elementary school and higher education mentioned here; 
this is because there was no concept of 'teenage hood' in most pre-modern 
societies. Therefore, graduates of kuttabs and others around the age of 
puberty either entered directly into madaaris/mosques or into the 'working 
world.' This study focuses on the experience of those who went to madaaris 
to continue a formal education (which would probably still be considered 
somewhat informal by current standards); however, even those that entered 
the formal labor force still participated in Islamic education given its central 
role in Muslim societies.   
Quality Islamic education was a communal activity that hinged less on 
books or institutions than on whom one actually learned and received an 
ijaza from ('authorization to pass on their knowledge'); education was a very 
personal experience (Berkey, 1992, pp. 16, 18; Niell, 2006, pp. 484-485). 
Given the importance of the Alim in Islamic education, a student was 
expected to take up to two months in choosing a teacher, choosing on the 
basis of the Alim’s own teachers‘reputation, age, and character. The 
centrality of the teacher was evident in the fact that biographical dictionaries 
of medieval scholars listed all the scholars an alim had learned from and 
usually nothing about where the learning actually took place, except maybe 
just the region (which you could often just tell from the alim’s last name) 
(Berkey, 1992, pp. 22-24). Needless to say, simply learning from a book was 
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considered illegitimate knowledge, and books themselves were just used for 
reference (Gunther, 2006). As guardians of the spiritual well-being of the 
society, ulamaa constructed intricate measures to preserve Islamic education 
as seen for example in the details of the ijaza or 'degree' system that was 
developed. Al Tusi, a medieval Alim, explained how, “memorizing two 
words is better than hearing two pages, but understanding two words is 
better than memorizing two pages”, which highlights that scholars 
differentiated between riwaya, the ability to memorize and transmit 
knowledge, and diraya, the ability to critically analyze it and apply it 
contextually. This differentiation was reflected in what type of authorization 
one had to teach; ijazas ranged in degrees, from general transmission of 
knowledge (tadrees) to issuing legal fatwas using that knowledge (iftaa’), 
corresponding to the level of comprehension attained (Berkey, 1992, pp. 30-
31). A fact often overlooked in discussions of the role of memorization in 
Islamic education (often politically motivated to portray a zombie-like 
system with no critical thought).   
The ulamaa even had 'teaching assistants' (with varying levels such as 
musamli, mufid, and mu’id); these were advanced students of the shaykh 
who would repeat in a loud voice the lecture to others far away in the halaqa, 
explain various ideas and highlight points of benefit to those he was 
responsible for (Berkey, 1992, pp. 40, 42). This shows the great concern that 
ulamaa had as they believed themselves to be 'inheritors of the prophets' (as 
goes the belief in theological scripture) in maintaining the high standards of 
Islamic education. Being that so much of the authority in Islamic higher 
education was decentralized to local ulamaa, the pressure was also on them 
to uphold the quality, integrity, and spread of Islamic education to the 
masses (Gunther, 2006). 
 
Centralizing Egyptian Islamic Higher Education 
 
The first madrasa or university in general is famously known as al-Azhar 
(founded in Egypt by the Fatamids in the late tenth century), but madaaris 
can actually be traced back as early as ninth century Iran.  The most famous 
madrasa of the early medieval period was that of Nizam al-Mulk, the Persian 
vizier to the Saljuq, in the late 11th century (Hefner & Zaman, 2007, p. 43).  
The Egyptian capital’s first madrasa was built by Saladin in 1170 during the 
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Ayyubid dynasty. After the devastation of Baghdad by the Mongol invasion 
in 1258, Cairo slowly turned into the cultural/educational capital of the 
Muslim ummah 4  (Berkey, 1992, p. 9). By the 14th and 15th centuries, 
madaaris had widely flourished under the Mamlukes and had become much 
more systematized as the Mamluke ruling class heavily sponsored the 
building and maintenance of madaaris. Surprisingly, despite this patronage, 
the Mamlukes left the educational system very decentralized in most 
decision making like that which concerned curriculum, pedagogy, and 
structure (Hefner & Zaman, 2007, p. 45). This is even more unexpected 
since the Mamlukes (lit: 'one who is owned') were a military elite captured 
as slaves from wars and bred to be the successive rulers (in no way an 
inherited dynasty), and they married from local ulamaa families (Berkey, 
1992, p. 11). Nonetheless, madaaris under the Mamlukes were fairly 
autonomous; only rarely would a waqf specify issues such as what subjects 
would be taught or at what times (Berkey, 1992, pp. 79, 87). One of the most 
famous of these madaaris and which provides an ideal prototype was al-
Ashrafiyya in Cairo. It was constructed and endowed as a waqf by Sultan al-
Ashraf Basrsbay. It had four halls surrounding the central courtyard, 
provided monthly salaries for the school’s instructional staff, stipends for ten 
to twenty-five students per class, housing accommodations for students, and 
doubled as a mosque (as most madaaris did) (Berkey, 1992, p. 54). 
Throughout the 15th century, madaaris flourished and became the major 
sector of employment for educational (ulamaa, ‘professors’, ‘teacher’s 
assistants’, qadis, ‘judges’, etc.), ‘religious’ (preachers, muezzins, people 
that announce the calls to prayer, Qur’an recitors, etc.), administrative 
(financial administers, controllers, notaries, etc.), and supportive positions 
(everything from doctors and librarians to gatekeepers, janitors, and incense 
burners) (Berkey, 1992, pp. 63-66). Madaaris had become so systematic that 
ulamaa were often given paid leave for visiting family, making hajj, and 
being ill; there was even a system for substitute teaching (Berkey, 1992, pp. 
92, 116). However, such increasing formality in the Mamluke educational 
system also had its drawbacks; now appointments in madaaris were heavily 
influenced if not selected by the Mamluke elite, giving preference to those 
who supported their initiatives. Centralizing decision-making under the 
authority of the ruling elite started to cause corruption and the financial 
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compensation now given to ulamaa had also begun to negatively affect 
ulamaa’s scholarship and work ethic (Al-Jabartee, 1997). 
Given the new material prospects and stability offered by the more 
bureaucratic educational system spread by the Mamlukes, many ulamaa lost 
sight of the metaphysical rewards of their efforts and viewing academia as a 
mere occupation became more prevalent. This also caused educational 
quality to suffer. Many 'professorships' were assigned in exchange for 
monetary 'gifts', and ibn Khaldun even lamented that many of the Mamluke 
elite started endowing schools as awqaaf as a way to manipulate the Islamic 
system of inheritance in a way that would benefit their heirs (Berkey, 1992, 
pp. 97, 134). As the scholars grew more and more dependent on the ruling 
elite, they grew less spiritual and sincere to their expected initial intentions 
for seeking knowledge—worship.  
Numerous scholars (especially those who still taught traditionally, in 
mosques) themselves complained about the spread of extravagance among 
many scholars associated with the formal madaaris--their fancy clothes and 
turbans, lack of studiousness and serious scholarship, and ostentatious 
manners. One such alim, al-Subki, criticized the lowering of educational 
standards due to this trend, complaining “they look at Mashariq al-anwar of 
al-Saghani, Masabih of al-Baghawi and call themselves muhadithun 
[Hadeeth scholars]… and maybe study Jami’ al-usul and ‘Ulum al-Hadeeth 
after that, or its abridgement by al-Nawawi, and they call themselves 
muhaddith of the muhadithun” (Berkey, 1992, pp. 184, 187). For someone to 
actually reach the level of these tomes (most of these are ten to thirty 
volumes long) would be quite an accomplishment in the present when there 
are very few major ulamaa left, but during that time period of scholarship, 
such works entailed a novice level of expertise. Closer ties between the 
ruling elite and ulamaa made many of the latter take lightly the hadeeth that 
“Whoever seeks knowledge to compete with the scholars or to debate with 
the ignorant ones or so that the people's faces can turn towards him, then 
Allah will enter him into the Hellfire” (USC, emphasis added). The negative 
effects of the centralization of Islamic higher education are even more 
apparent when sharply contrasted with the brief years of de-centralized 
madrasa administration under the Ottoman dynasty in the 16th and 17th 
centuries.  
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Brief Decentralization 
 
In the 16th century, the Ottoman Empire had taken over control of Egypt, but 
since the Ottomans’ power was on the decline, Egypt retained a certain 
amount of autonomy. Throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, the Ottoman 
empire did not have much influence on the culture or daily dealings of 
Egyptian society mainly because it was involved with many other political 
crises and wars, trying to maintain its sovereignty and the integrity of its 
borders as a whole; hence, it did not try to 'Ottomanize' Egypt’s educational 
system or impose its language once it gained control of Egypt (Daly, 1998, 
pp. 1-26). Even the local Egyptian viceroys did not manipulate or exert 
authority over madaaris during this time. This autonomy meant that neither 
the Ottoman elite nor the local Egyptian viceroys tried to impose political 
influence over the structure and appointments over the madaaris as the 
Mamlukes did, returning sovereignty and political neutrality to Egyptian 
madaaris.  
The negative consequence to this sovereignty was that the Ottomans 
hardly sponsored the opening of any new Egyptian madaaris, leaving al-
Azhar as the main, if not only, formal institution for Islamic higher 
education in Egypt by the 18th century (Al Jabartee, 1997).  However, 
quality of Islamic higher education greatly improved during this time as 
tremendous scholarship was produced (Al Sirjaany, 2005); accordingly, 
quality proved more important than quantity as students of Islamic 
knowledge flocked from all over the Muslim world to learn at al-Azhar, 
making al-Azhar the hub of Islamic higher education as it brought in 
international talent and expertise (Daly, 1998, pp. 88-91, 96). The quality of 
Islamic higher education and its importance in societal cohesion had a 
positive correlation with the decentralization of decision-making and relative 
economic independence of educators from the ruling elite.  
 
A Glance at Informal Islamic Higher Education for Comparison 
 
Further proof of this correlation between the quality, access, and influence of 
Islamic higher education on the one hand and its de-centralization on the 
other may be seen in the fact that there is little or no recorded evidence of a 
pattern of decreasing educational quality, marginalization of the importance 
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of Islamic education, or increased corruption in the informal sector of 
Islamic higher education as political regimes rose and fell—they were 
relatively unaffected due to their distance from royal happenings (Al-
Jabartee, 1997). In fact, many great non-madrasa affiliated ulamaa also 
appeared throughout the medieval period, possibly more than those officially 
employed by madaaris, like Hasan al-Basri (9th century), Khateeb al-
Baghdadi (11th century), Ibn Athir (12th century), Ibn Taymiyya (13th 
century), Ibn Kathir (14th century), and al-Jabarti (18th century) (Al Salaaby, 
2006; Najeebabadi, 2000).  
Many such non-madrasa employed scholars had the best libraries in the 
Muslim world with everything from theological and astronomy related 
works to poetry and medicine. Even more amazing is that these scholars’ 
libraries were often open for public use (and even borrowing)—people from 
all levels of the social scale (from incense burners to doctors) travelled to 
use their libraries (Daly, 1998, pp. 97-10; Iqbal, 2007). This had tremendous 
benefits in increasing literacy and knowledge acquisition among the masses 
since most people would not attend madrasas by the 18th century when there 
was only Al Azhar left (Al Salaaby, 2006; Najeebabadi, 2000). For example, 
al-Jabarti was an amazing scientist, historian, and theological Alim whose 
house was always filled with students. Some of them even lived with him 
and married from his family. Many students would often travel to just come 
see al-Jabarti’s father’s medical instruments (Al-Jabartee, 1997). 
Furthermore, most of the positive empirical sciences in Muslim-majority 
countries actually developed outside formal madaaris during the Middle 
Ages (Ali, 2009; Iqbal, 2007). The higher quality of informal Islamic higher 
education (which was decentralized by its very nature) offers further 
evidence of the positive correlation between decentralization of authority 
and better educational quality and access in formal Islamic Higher Education 
as it existed in the Middle Ages.  
Hence, Napoleon would later record that one-third of the population of 
Cairo were literate, a relatively high figure for 1798. The effect of informal 
education on literacy was also apparent in the large number of 'vulgar' 
works, simplified summaries of larger theological works (many about how 
to be a good overall Muslim) designed for laymen—some even using 
colloquial Arabic by the 18th century (Daly, 1998, pp. 105, 109).  
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Looking back, it seems the best Islamic education was provided by 
ulamaa independent of any expectations from the ruling elite, whether in the 
formal or informal sector. Similar advice was given by prophet Muhammad 
when he stated “Whoever approaches the ruler’s gates becomes afflicted. 
Whenever a servant [Muslim] draws closer to the ruler, he only gains 
distance from Allah”, and by his companions when they warned “Don’t go, 
even if they ask you to visit them just to recite qul huwallaahu ahad [the 
first verse of the smallest chapter in the Qur’an]” (USC, 39). These 
admonitions highlight the concern of prophet Muhammad and his 
companions with preventing Islamic education from being manipulated by 
elite rulers for their political ambitions. Underscoring this concept is the 
general apprehension about wealth’s potential spiritual drawbacks if not 
used for the pleasure of God (such as charity, etc.) as also expressed by 
prophet Muhammad when he said the “biggest test/trial for my Ummah 
(nation) is wealth” (USC, 512). Lack of autonomy for educators left 
Ulamma more susceptible to the whims of the ruling elite and damaged the 
state of formal Islamic higher education in Egypt as explicated even by local 
historians of that era such as Al-Jabartee (1997).  
The introduction of increased material benefits that could be earned by 
madaaris ulamaa if they became supportive appendages to the political 
regime in the late Middle Ages led to the decrease of educational quality, 
corruption, and decreased appreciation for the Islamic education they held in 
general. As al-Azhar became the bastion for Sunni Islam in 18th century 
Egypt, theological authority became even more centralized, and 
subsequently easier to manipulate as a mouthpiece for French and British 
colonizers.  
 
Colonization and Neo-colonization Vis á Vis Centralization 
 
In October 1798 the French colonized Egypt. Al-Azhar was pelted with 
canons, raided, and desecrated as French soldiers destroyed al-Azhar’s 
libraries and relieved themselves on the remains, slaughtering anyone they 
came upon (Dykstra, 1998; Kincehloe & Steinberg, 2004, p. 127). Napoleon 
tried to find ulamaa to justify his invasion as a rescuer coming to free the 
Egyptians from the Turks; however, some ulamaa like al-Jabarti stood up to 
this onslaught (Al Salaaby, 2006; Al Sirjaany, 2005). The French knew the 
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strongest resistance to their forces would come from the ulamaa and other 
theological sectors of society; hence, they focused on subverting Islamic 
education, the roots of Islamic culture. One French author exclaimed, “We, 
the masters, should seize on our subjects in their early youth. We shall 
change the tastes and habits of the whole people…after the pattern of our 
laws” (Kincehloe & Steinberg, 2004, p. 128). Nonetheless, Napoleon would 
later find those who would 'trade their souls' for power and appointed 
ulamaa like Shaykh Khalil al-Bakri to promote popular support for the 
French occupation; those that didn’t become 'government scholars' either 
fled the country or at least left their positions; some were killed in rebellions 
like those at al-Azhar (Daly, 1998, p. 125). Being that al-Azhar was now the 
main locus of Islamic education, it left the ulamaa all in one place for easy 
manipulation (Al-Jabartee, 1997; Hussein, 2008). By 1801, The French had 
been driven out of Egypt and Muhammad Ali emerged as official viceroy for 
the Ottoman Empire; now Ali planned to re-educate Egypt with Western 
military expertise/technology and accelerate Egyptian industrialization to 
keep European hegemony at bay (Fahmy, 1998). However, in arming Egypt 
with the previous colonizer’s empirical sciences to fend off their canons, he 
replaced Islamic higher education with Western cannons (Kincehloe & 
Steinberg, 2004, p. 128).  
Muhammad Ali, implemented a Western (French, British, and Italian) 
model of secular education in Egypt through 'civil schools' which trained 
students in military skills, engineering, medicine, foreign languages, and 
agriculture among other things; this process was called Modernization 
(Ofori-Attah, 2008, pp. 15, 18). However, this expansion was done at the 
expense of Islamic education; most periphery theological institutions were 
closed and al-Azhar (which Ali took control of through patronage of 
ulamaa) was overburdened with providing Islamic higher education for the 
entire country (Fahmy, 1998). The integrity of most establishment ulamaa 
had been severely compromised as will be detailed shortly. The technocratic 
graduates replaced al-Azhar graduates in the workforce as well. Foreign 
teachers were brought in to teach at the civil schools, and the student-
centered pedagogy that was once symbolic of Islamic education was 
replaced by a lecturing ('banking') method transplanted from British 
Lancaster schools (Gesink, 2006, pp. 328-329). These Lancaster civil 
schools were used to create an obedient labor mentality among the masses, 
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while reserving intellectual activity for the new secular Western based 
universities being opened up for the elite--ideal for defending Western 
interests in the region (Szyliowicz, 1973, p. 127). Accordingly, the quality of 
Islamic higher education sharply decreased. Any issues that contradicted the 
Western value system became susceptible to adjustment and now intensity of 
education really had stopped at mere memorization (theological texts and 
everything else); the importance of Islamic higher education waned 
(Hussein, 2008). Since al-Azhar was the last institute for Islamic higher 
education and control of it was centralized under Muhammad Ali, the 
marginalization of Islamic higher education was decisive and would prove 
arduous to reverse.  
Under de facto British control throughout the early 20th century, various 
descendents of the Ali dynasty continued this intellectual colonization as 
most remnants of local history, culture, and deen were removed from 
education (Gesink, 2006, pp. 329-330; Hunter, 1998). The growing civil 
schools also reduced access to education as a whole due to the new fees and 
preliminary language tests required for entrance, under Lord Cromer of 
Britain, which classified many more Egyptians as 'illiterate' (Ofori-Attah, 
2008, p. 18). In short, the Modernization of Egyptian education throughout 
the early 20th century effectively secularized society and marginalized 
Islamic culture and education to the periphery—neo-colonization through a 
local but Western educated ruling class, which allowed for a 'semblance of 
native legitimacy' (Hussein, 2008; Kincheloe & Steinberg, 2004, p. 149). 
Islamic education’s last institution, al-Azhar, was losing what little effect 
and legitimacy it still had in society.  
Ali had also sent many ulamaa to France who not only brought back with 
them military science and technological expertise, but an entire Western 
liberal value system; Modernization came to mean Westernization (Hefner & 
Zaman, 2007, p.114; Tageldin, 2011). Modernism presented ‘religion’ as 
irrational (by the European Enlightenment definition) and Secular 
Humanism as rational and civilized (Moore, 2007, pp. 36, 57-58). At the 
time that Ali sent them, he simply intended to gain the scientific (as in the 
empirical based, not the more philosophy related social based sciences) 
expertise from the West, but those sent abroad did not get a customized 
curriculum; they also received the 'hidden curriculum' of Western liberal 
values (Hussein, 2008, pp. 19-20; Tageldin, 2011). These ulamaa were 
HSE – Social and Education History, 7(2) 191 
 
 
highly affected by the Saint Simonists, believers in the 'religion of social 
science' to culturally and industrially develop Egypt, who tried to effectively 
replace deen with Western philosophy—like that of Voltaire and Maistre—
and even more pragmatically with the belief system of nationalism (contrary 
to the Islamic precept of identity based on deen above any territorial/cultural 
labels) (Hussein, 2008, p. 16, 21; Kincheloe & Steinberg, 2004, pp. 142-
144). Hasan al-Attar for example was sent to learn in Paris and later returned 
as an al-Azhar Alim to teach modernist reformer Tahtawi, who was key in 
Westernizing Egyptian schools (Imaara, 2011).  
Tahtawi was not just impressed by French empirical science, he also tried 
to apply Western philosophy to theological texts and was one of the earliest 
Secular Humanist Muslims in the Muslim world calling for a new 
customized Islam that would agree with the Western value systems that he 
believed to be the new deen for the future. He praised nationalism, mixing of 
the sexes, and essentially any Western cultural trait as necessary for material 
progress, deeming practically the importation of any value system or 
behavior beneficial as long as it developed the economics of the country 
(Ali, 2009; Imaara, 2011; Sabrin, 2013; Tageldin, 2011). Most ulamaa were 
furious at this total disregard for Islamic culture and priorities to the extent 
that they labeled such ulamaa ‘protestant’; however, there was little they 
could do while they remained employed by al-Azhar. Many scholars (Azhari 
and non-Azhari) spoke out against this intellectual colonization, but as 
Muhammad Ali had de facto marginalized other madrasas outside of al-
Azhar and controlled the official discourse coming from al-Azhar, most 
views that didn’t support the political regime were silenced (Hussein, 2008, 
pp. 22-24, 106).  
 Later protégés of Tahtawi throughout the 20th century, like Muhammad 
Abduh, would continue this cycle of neo-colonization through education, 
carrying the banner for a new modern Islam (Kincheloe & Steinberg, 2004, 
p. 129). The natural conclusion of the Secular Humanist beliefs Abduh 
inherited from Tahtawi was argued to be secularism and Islam was slowly 
pushed out of the public sphere (Hussein, 2008, pp. 91, 142; Sabrin, 2013). 
Contrary to what some scholars have often posited, that Islamic values 
themselves would have been somehow in conflict with Western empirical 
science or technology (Spring, 2006, p. 153), it seems it was rather the 
liberal value system that posed a problem for the native population as 
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modern studies of the Egyptian population suggest (Cook, 1999, p. 11). It 
seems Ali benefitted from Western expertise in the empirical sciences, but 
participated in his own country’s intellectual neo-colonization in the process. 
Through centralized control of Islamic higher education in Egypt, quality 
declined, corruption of ulamaa seems to have been unavoidable, and Islamic 
higher education itself was de facto almost eliminated from society since it 
was so directly responsive to the political initiatives of one man, the head of 
state.  
By the late 19th century, al-Azhar was the last Madrasa representing 
Islamic higher education in Egypt. Due to the military weaknesses perceived 
after French and British colonization, Muhammad Ali had sought to 
restructure the higher education system in Egypt by pushing Islamic higher 
education to the periphery and focusing tertiary education on military and 
industrial expertise he had transplanted from Western Europe. However in 
doing so, Ali delegitimized the last source of formal Islamic higher 
education in Egypt (al-Azhar), and placed it at the whims of his political 
regime. Since control of al-Azhar was completely centralized under Ali, 
Islamic higher education was manipulated as a source for justifying the 
political regime’s Modernization/ Westernization of Egyptian society. By 
entrusting all decision making to the ruling elite, al-Azhar was no longer a 
place for quality Islamic scholarship, but rather an official mouthpiece for 
the government (Hefner & Zaman, 2007, p.108).  
Under Egyptian president Gamal abd al-Nasser in the 1950s, awqaaf 
were “nationalized” completely (taken over by the ruling dictator) and the 
Reform Law of 1961 re-centered al-Azhar’s “function and religious 
authority around the military ruling elite” (Hefner & Zaman, 2007, p. 117). 
The Shaykh al-Azhar (highest position in al-Azhar) rank and salary was 
made that of a regular government minister and the appointed were paid to 
issue fatwas (Islamic legal rulings) at the request of the ruler; non-
government ulamaa were forced to resign (Hefner & Zaman, 2007, p. 118). 
Being that ulamaa were pressured to either comply with political demands or 
lose their position in the last madrasa representing Islamic education; this 
compromised the integrity of any ulamaa wishing to have a serious public 
voice in society. Islam was consequently marginalized from the public 
sphere and replaced with an intellectual neo-colonization of the mass 
Egyptian population until the 1970s when an Islamic revival would later 
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occur (Hussein, 2008). However, al-Azhar the sole official institute of 
Islamic higher education seems to have been effectively re-designed as a 
government medium. While most Egyptians now look to non-government 
ulamaa (at mosques and on television) for spiritual guidance, Islam does not 
seem to be as pervasive a means of identification and fabric of social 
cohesion as it was before.  
 
Conclusion 
 
From the Medieval to the Modern, the centralization of formal Islamic 
Higher Education in Egypt seems to have had negative effects. We have 
illustrated how, over time, the centralization of Islamic Higher Education 
played a central role in decreasing educational quality, increasing corruption, 
decreasing general levels of and appreciation for Islamic knowledge, and 
even supporting Imperial initiatives. In the early Medieval Islamic history of 
Egypt, Islamic education was highly accessible to the general masses, of 
high quality, and was pursued as a means to becoming more God conscious. 
Islamic education was an act of worship with solely metaphysical rewards. 
Islamic theological education was the primary source of identity and created 
a culture of knowledge among Egyptians since as far as we know the 
percentage of Muslims was not much different from the modern day 
statistics of roughly 93% of the population. Since there were no material 
benefits to Islamic education and the ulamaa who controlled it locally were 
autonomous, away from political pressures and influences, the integrity of 
formal Islamic education was preserved and flourished from the mosque to 
the madrasa.  
However, throughout the 15th century when Islamic higher education 
become highly centralized, quality, the spiritual essence of formal Islamic 
education, and its place in society, suffered as madrasas themselves became 
primarily limited to higher education—realistically limiting the student 
population to a minority of the population—and became a mere occupation 
for material gain for many involved.  
During the 16th and 17th centuries, numerous examples were given of how 
although lack of state sponsorship and decentralization often affected the 
quantity of Islamic higher education institutions, quality increased. 
Examples were also provided from informal Islamic higher education as 
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additional support for the positive effects of decentralized Islamic higher 
education. 
Under the extreme centralization of Muhammad Ali in the 19th and 20th 
centuries, Islam itself was relatively speaking removed from the public 
sphere and replaced by Western philosophy and culture since centralization 
had reduced Islamic higher education to one institute whose credibility had 
been reduced to a mere mouthpiece for the ruling elite—whether indigenous 
or colonial in nature. This latter point has been one of the most important 
contributions of this study—the role that centralizing Islamic higher 
education in Egypt played in the colonial history of the country—facilitating 
political and intellectual colonialism.  
Today, there has been much demand for Islamically compatible higher 
education in Egypt despite what little empirical research is allowed on such 
topics (Cook, 1999, p. 6). It has been seen that if Islamic higher (or pre-
collegiate for that matter) education is to be revitalized in Egypt, ulamaa 
should be autonomous and independent of the ruling elite as to provide 
quality Islamic higher education that not only increases intellectual 
awareness of Islam, but re-positions it as a source of spiritual reinvigoration 
amidst the rampant socio-economic predicaments that exist. This seems to 
be a necessary first step to reviving Islamic education—its theological and 
empirical branches. It would not be a stretch of the imagination to say that 
more decentralization of Egyptian educational institutions in general would 
only increase quality of education given the unfortunate autocratic 
atmosphere even post WWII in Egypt. As much of the South is still 
struggling for liberation in a supposedly postcolonial era, there seems no 
escaping from the fact that without truly ‘free’ academic institutions, 
political and economic freedom will also remain a fantasy.  
 
Note
 
1 This term is used to avoid the exclusionary nature of ‘Muslim World’ that seems to portray 
Muslims living without interaction with non-Muslim controlled territories or that there were 
no non-Muslims living in Muslim-controlled territories. ‘Islamic World’ is also avoided since 
it seems to imply an Orientalist image that all happenings in such territories were solely 
directed by the dictates of theological scripture irrespective of culture, political factors, 
personal interests, etc. 
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2 This is the perspective prevalent in modern day academic scholarship in contrast to the 
Islamic theological perspective that God only revealed one religion with initial differences 
merely in subsidiary issues, and that various peoples’ tampered with certain aspects of 
scripture historically to produce the various ‘man-made’ variations that exist today as separate 
‘religions’. 
3 In Arabic, the language of the Qur’an and Sunnah, the word religion actually doesn’t exist; 
the closest translation is ‘deen’ (way of life), one of the points that highlights the tension 
between Islam and secularism to the present. 
4 Muslims believe that all the prophets (i.e.: Adam, Abraham, Jesus, Muhammad, etc.) all 
originally came with the same central message of Tawheed (worshipping only God), but 
different ‘branches’ or details (how to pray, etc.) contextual to their time period and location; 
each Prophet had their own ‘branches’ for their particular ummah (the ummah of the Jews, of 
the Christians, etc.), but all still technically ‘Muslims’ as long as they followed whatever 
legislation (Sharia) their Prophets came with at that time. Basically, they chose to do 
‘istislaam’ or ‘Islam’ (which means submission) to the message their Prophet came with; 
hence, they were Muslim. Prophet Muhammad is believed to be the final Prophet from his 
time until judgment day for humanity. The Muslim ummah refers to the Islamic belief that all 
humans born after Prophet Muhammad’s prophethood are technically considered from the 
ummah of Muhammad in a general sense (the ummat al dawa or ‘invitation’), but those who 
choose to accept this invitation by believing and following him are the more specific ummat 
al ijaaba (ummah of those who responded), who are called Muslims today. 
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